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Commercial Transportation
Madeline E. McNeeley,*
Sarah L. Adle,**
Elizabeth M. Brooks,***
Joshua H. Dorminy,****
Stephen G. Lowry*****
I. INTRODUCTION
Commercial transportation involves all the significant forms of
passenger and freight transportation across the United States. This
Article surveys significant judicial, regulatory, and legislative
developments in Georgia commercial transportation law from June 1,
2020, through May 31, 2021.1

*Partner, Harris Lowry Manton LLP. University of Tennessee (B.A. & B.S., magna cum
laude, 1999); University of Maryland, College Park (M.S., 2001); University of Tennessee
College of Law (J.D., summa cum laude, 2008). Member, State Bars of Georgia and
Tennessee.
**Counsel, Harris Lowry Manton LLP. University of Florida (B.A., with honors, 2000);
Emory University School of Law (J.D., 2004). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
***Associate, Harris Lowry Manton LLP. Mercer University (B.A., cum laude, 2013); Mercer
University School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2017). Member, State Bars of Georgia and South
Carolina.
****Associate, Harris Lowry Manton LLP. Shorter University (B.A., summa cum laude,
2012); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 2015). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*****Partner, Harris Lowry Manton LLP. University of Maryland Baltimore County (B.A.,
magna cum laude, 1995); Lewis and Clark College Northwestern School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 1998). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of commercial transportation law during the prior Survey period,
see Madeline E. McNeeley, Yvonne S. Godfrey, Elizabeth M. Brooks, Joshua H. Dorminy,
& Stephen G. Lowry, Commercial Transportation, 72 MERCER L. REV. 45 (2020).
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II. TRUCKING AND OTHER COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLES
In Stubbs Oil Company, Inc. v. Price, the Georgia Court of Appeals
answered several questions pertaining to liability in a wrongful death
action involving a commercial motor vehicle.2 Specifically, the question
before the Georgia Court of Appeals in Stubbs was whether an oil
company, as well as its insurer, that hired a motor carrier to transport
its oil could be held vicariously liable as defendants.3
Three people were killed when Christopher Hinson, who was operating
an oil tanker truck at seventy-nine miles per hour, collided with a
compact vehicle.4 Hinson was employed by Southern Oil Refinery, LLC
(Southern Oil) and was on his way to obtain oil for delivery at the time of
the crash. Stubbs Oil Company, Inc. (Stubbs Oil), a business involved in
purchasing fuel products from large oil companies and reselling the fuel
to retail gas station franchises and agricultural and government entities,
occasionally hired Southern Oil to transport fuel to its retail service
stations. On June 19, 2015, Hinson retrieved the fuel tanker from
Southern Oil’s facility and, while on his way to pick up the fuel, rearended a vehicle driven by Beverly Baird. Baird and the two passengers
in her vehicle, Nicholas Price and Ricardo Dewberry, all died as a result
of the collision.5 The representatives of their estates filed suit, specifically
alleging that “Hinson’s negligent operation of the fuel tanker truck
resulted in a motor-vehicle collision that killed three people, and
Southern Oil was vicariously liable as Hinson’s employer.”6 The plaintiffs
also argued that Stubbs Oil was vicariously liable because it “acted as
Hinson and Southern Oil’s statutory employer under the FMCSRs
[Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations]” and that Federated Service
Insurance Company (Federated), Stubbs Oil’s insurer, was liable under
the direct action statute permitting actions against the insurer of a motor
carrier for hire.7
Stubbs Oil and Federated filed separate motions for summary
judgment at the trial court level.8 Stubbs Oil contended that it could not
be vicariously liable to the plaintiffs because, “(1) [I]t was a shipper,
rather than a motor carrier for hire, and was not a statutory employer
under the FMCSRs; (2) Hinson and Southern Oil were independent
contractors under Georgia law; and (3) it owed no duty to ensure
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

357 Ga. App. 606, 848 S.E.2d 739 (2020).
Id. at 606, 848 S.E.2d at 741.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 609, 848 S.E.2d at 743.
Id.
Id.
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Southern Oil’s carrier status.”9 Federated argued that it could not be held
vicariously liable to the plaintiffs and was not subject to a direct action
under Title 40, Chapter 1, Section 112 of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated.10 The Gordon Superior Court denied both motions for
summary judgment, summarily finding that Southern Oil “could only
operate as a private motor carrier, and therefore, Stubbs Oil was—
seemingly by implication—Hinson and Southern Oil’s statutory
employer.”11 Stubbs Oil and Federated received permission for
interlocutory appeals.12
As to Stubbs Oil’s appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals analyzed the
language in the FMCSRs and reversed the trial court’s finding that
Stubbs Oil was a motor carrier, determining that Stubbs Oil was a
shipper rather than a motor carrier under the FMCSR definitions.13 The
plaintiffs argued that, even if Stubbs Oil was a shipper pursuant to the
FMCSRs, it could still be held liable as a statutory employer, but the
court rejected this argument.14 The court stated initially that the
FMCSRs apply only to motor carriers, not to shippers who engage
carriers to transport their goods.15 The court also noted that Georgia
precedent makes “the existence of a lease between the defendant and the
owner of the vehicle . . . the defining element in creating a statutory
employment relationship under the FMCSRs[,]” and it reasoned that
because there was “[no] evidence of either a written or oral lease between
Hinson or Southern Oil and Stubbs Oil,” Stubbs Oil could not be held
liable as a statutory employer.16 The court of appeals further noted that
“the tanker truck involved in the accident bore the logo and [Department
of Transportation (DOT)] number of Southern Oil, not Stubbs Oil,” and
Stubbs Oil exercised no control over how Hinson or Southern Oil carried
out the delivery, further supporting the conclusion that Stubbs Oil was
not operating as a motor carrier at the time of the collision.17
Similarly, the court of appeals concluded that Stubbs Oil could not be
held vicariously liable under a respondeat superior theory because
Southern Oil was acting as its independent contractor.18 The court of

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id. at 615, 848 S.E.2d at 747.
Id. at 609, 848 S.E.2d at 743.
Id. (consolidating and addressing in a single opinion).
Id. at 610, 848 S.E.2d at 744.
Id. at 611, 848 S.E.2d at 744–45.
Id. at 610, 848 S.E.2d at 744.
Id. at 611, 848 S.E.2d at 745.
Id. at 612, 848 S.E.2d at 745.
Id. at 613, 848 S.E.2d at 746.
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appeals analyzed the facts under O.C.G.A. § 9-2-4, the employer-liability
statute, and held that Stubbs Oil “merely hired Southern Oil to transport
its fuel products to a retail service station, but had no input as to the
driver or the vehicle Southern Oil would use to complete the task.”19 The
court concluded that Southern Oil retained the right to perform delivery
of the fuel “by their own means, method, and manner,” foreclosing any
possibility that Southern Oil could be considered anything other than an
independent contractor.20
Stubbs Oil’s last contention on appeal was that it did not owe a duty
to ensure Southern Oil’s carrier status.21 The court of appeals
acknowledged the trial court’s order was “not entirely clear” as to the
basis for the denial of summary judgment, but “seem[ed] to imply” a
document regarding Southern Oil’s alleged lack of operating authority
nine months after the incident, which created a genuine issue as to
whether Stubbs Oil had breached a duty to ensure its carrier status
before the incident.22 The court was “unpersuaded” that this document
created an issue for trial, and it noted the plaintiffs had not cited any
Georgia authority for their other proposition that “Stubbs Oil should be
liable for negligently hiring Southern Oil because the act of driving a
tractor-trailer is inherently dangerous[.]”23 Stubbs Oil did not owe a duty
to the plaintiffs to ensure Southern Oil’s carrier status and, thus, could
not be held liable under this theory.24
Finally, as to Federated’s appeal of the direct-action question, the
court held that because Stubbs Oil could not be held vicariously liable,
its insurer also could not be held liable.25 Because Stubbs Oil was acting
as a shipper, not a motor carrier, at the time of the crash, Stubbs Oil’s
insurer could not be held liable to the plaintiffs under O.C.G.A.
§ 40-1-112.26
In reversing the trial court on every issue that was appealed, the court
of appeals made clear that the ultimate purpose of permitting joinder of
an insurance company in a negligence action involving a motor carrier is
in furtherance of the public policy behind the Motor Carrier Act, which
is to protect the public against injuries caused by a motor carrier’s
negligence and to allow the insurer to stand in the shoes of the motor
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 614, 848 S.E.2d at 746.
Id.
Id. at 614, 848 S.E.2d at 747.
Id.
Id. at 614–15, 848 S.E.2d at 747.
Id.
Id. at 615, 848 S.E.2d at 747.
Id. at 615–16, 848 S.E.2d at 747.
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carrier.27 The key is that such liability can only be extended to the insurer
of the motor carrier itself, not the insurer of the shipper.28
III. AVIATION
Commercial aviation is largely controlled by federal authority, but
there are many areas where it is within state jurisdiction. Multiple state
organizations are involved in aviation regulation, as it has
environmental, public safety, and economic impacts. Due to the
significant role that aviation plays in this state, the Georgia Aviation
Authority exists to assist “state aircraft and aviation operations,
ensuring the safety of people traveling by air and aviation property.”29
While there were no judicial developments during this Survey period,
state legislative and regulatory agencies continued to address aviation
issues, despite the ongoing Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic.
Noting that “the current and future economic health of Georgia relies
on thriving airports and an efficient air travel industry,” the state
legislature enacted a resolution creating the Joint Study Committee on
Airport Infrastructure and Improvements.30 The committee will perform
a study on funding and policy development relating to airports,
emphasizing efficiency, and coordination within the aviation industry.31
By year’s end, the committee must file a report and any proposed
legislation it deems necessary based on the study’s results.32 Thus, there
is potential aviation legislation on the horizon to protect and advance
Georgia’s role as a national “leader in the movement of goods and
persons[.]”33
The legislature also passed a bill governing the licensing of airports.34
Operating airports without regulation of minimum and uniform safety
requirements endangers lives and property.35 To establish and improve
a safer system of airports and operating conditions within them, the state
provides for the licensing of airports based on certain rules and
regulations.36 One such rule is that an airport operator must first obtain,

27. Id. at 616, 848 S.E.2d at 747.
28. Id. at 616, 848 S.E.2d at 748.
29. Georgia
Aviation
Authority,
GEORGIA.GOV,
https://georgia.gov/organization/georgia-aviation-authority (last visited Jul. 8, 2021).
30. Ga. S. Res. 84 (2021).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Ga. H.R. Bill 577, Reg. Sess. (2021).
35. O.C.G.A. § 32-9-8(b) (2021).
36. O.C.G.A. § 32-9-8(b)–(d).
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and thereafter maintain, a valid license.37 This statutory amendment
lays out the procedure and remedies for an airport operator’s failure to
comply with the state’s licensing requirements.38
On the regulatory front, the Environmental Protection Division of the
Department of Natural Resources adopted air quality rules relevant to
aviation.39 The Georgia Air Quality Act serves to:
[P]reserve, protect, and improve air quality and to control emissions to
prevent the significant deterioration of air quality and to attain and
maintain ambient air quality standards so as to safeguard the public
health, safety, and welfare consistent with providing for maximum
employment and full industrial development of the state.40

Air quality control includes regulating the volatile organic compound
(VOC) emissions from aerospace vehicles and their components.41 Under
the Air Quality Act, general aviation is now defined as “that segment of
civil aviation that encompasses all facets of aviation except air carriers,
commuters, and military. General aviation includes charter and
corporate-executive
transportation,
instruction,
rental,
aerial
application, aerial observation, business, pleasure, and other special
uses.”42 While this is specific to environmental regulation, it
demonstrates the breadth of issues that fall under the aviation umbrella.
IV. RAILROADS
Regulations governing railroads traditionally stem from federal
regulations. Attempts by several states to regulate railroads are often
preempted by the applicable federal law. However, on May 5, 2021, the
governor of Georgia signed House Bill 588 into law.43 This bill amends
several code sections to clarify the definition of a “public benefit” in the
context of public-private partnerships for the Georgia Freight Railroad
Program.44 House Bill 588 also dedicates certain tax revenue to be used
for freight and logistics projects in Georgia.45
The Georgia Freight Railroad Program enhances Georgia’s investment
in freight rail projects to benefit the public and supports a safe and
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

O.C.G.A. § 32-9-8(i).
Id.
GA COMP. R. & REGS. § 391-3-1-.03 (2021).
O.C.G.A. § 12-9-2 (2021).
GA COMP. R. & REGS. § 391-3-1-.02(2)(kkk) (2021).
GA COMP. R. & REGS. § 391-3-1-.02(2)(kkk)(17)(xlv) (2021).
Ga. H.R. Bill 588, Reg. Sess. (2021).
Id. at § (1)(f).
Id.
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balanced transportation system for the state.46 The program empowers
the DOT Commissioner to utilize public funds for rail enhancement
projects to acquire, lease, or improve railways or railroad equipment,
including rail crossings, rolling stock, rights of way, or rail facilities; rail
preservation projects to improve short line railways, and rail industrial
projects to improve industrial access to railroad tracks and related
facilities.47 House Bill 588 amended the Georgia Freight Railroad
Program to require the DOT Commissioner to make certain
determinations prior to the expenditure of state funds dealing with
railways in Georgia.48 Under the new law, the Commissioner must
demonstrate “a benefit accrued to the public in the form of enhanced
public safety, enhanced mobility of goods, congestion mitigation,
enhanced trade and economic development, improved air quality or land
use, [or] reduction of public expenditures due to improved transportation
efficiency or infrastructure preservation.”49
House Bill 588 further added a new code section which provides for
appropriation of certain taxes to be used exclusively for freight and
logistics projects in Georgia.50 Official Code of Georgia Annotated
§ 48-8-78 provides that any funds collected through taxes on retail
purchase, retail sale, rental, storage use, or consumption of fuel used
exclusively in the operation of locomotives “shall be appropriated to the
Department of Transportation for use exclusively on freight and logistics
projects located on or connected to publicly owned roads.”51 The new code
section empowers the Commissioner of the DOT to allocate the funds
based on a formula that includes considerations of total track miles
operated within the state by a common carrier and any other factors that
the Commissioner may deem appropriate.52
V. TRANSPORTATION FOR HIRE: LIVERY AND RIDESHARE SERVICES
Federal courts in the Eleventh Circuit have had several opportunities
in recent years to address the arbitrability of labor disputes and other
claims involving rideshare apps, but Georgia’s state courts had not yet
squarely considered these issues.53 In 2020, the Georgia Court of Appeals
46. O.C.G.A. § 32-2-41.3 (2021).
47. Id.
48. Ga. H.R. Bill 588, Reg. Sess. § (1)(f).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. O.C.G.A. § 48-8-78(b) (2021).
52. Id. at § 48-8-78.
53. See, e.g., Madeline E. McNeeley et al., Commercial Transportation, 2019 Eleventh
Circuit Survey, 71 MERCER L. REV. 951, 964–65 (2020).
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finally addressed as a matter of first impression whether the
“browsewrap”54 arbitration agreement in the Uber ride-request app is
binding on its customers.55
Ryan Thornton was murdered by his rideshare driver in 2018.56 His
mother brought a wrongful-death action against the rideshare company,
Uber Technologies, Inc. (Uber), which moved to compel arbitration
pursuant to an arbitration agreement in the terms and conditions of use
of its customer app. The DeKalb State Court granted the motion, but
Thornton’s mother filed an interlocutory appeal, and the Court of
Appeals of Georgia reversed and remanded.57
The court of appeals described the relevant screen of the app as
follows:
The version of the Uber app at issue in this case prompted a user to
either enter his credit card information or link his PayPal account. The
top portion of the payment screen contains fields for the user to input
his credit card information. The middle portion of the screen contains
a button labeled “Register” and a button to link a PayPal account.
Underneath the two buttons, near the bottom of the screen, small,
dark gray text reads “BY CREATING AN UBER ACCOUNT, YOU
AGREE TO OUR TERMS & CONDITIONS AND PRIVACY POLICY.”
The words “TERMS & CONDITIONS AND PRIVACY POLICY” are
presented as a hyperlink in blue, underlined text. If clicked on, a user
would be directed to a document containing Uber’s terms and
conditions for users of its services. The terms and conditions explain
that a user is entering into a contract with Uber and is bound by the
terms and conditions through the user’s access and use of Uber’s
services. Uber’s terms and conditions contain an arbitration clause,
under which the user agrees to settle any disputes arising out of the
use of Uber’s services.58
Appellant presented evidence that a user on a smartphone with an
Android operating system experienced an on-screen keyboard
appearing at the bottom of the screen when they clicked on the
54. “On the internet, the primary means of forming a contract are the so-called ‘clickwrap’ (or ‘click-through’) agreements, in which website users typically click an ‘I agree’ box
after being presented with a list of terms and conditions of use, and the ‘browsewrap’
agreements, where website terms and conditions of use are posted on the website typically
as a hyperlink at the bottom of the screen.” Thornton v. Uber Techs., Inc., 858 S.E.2d 255,
259 n.1 (2021), petition for cert. filed, (Ga. June 28, 2021) (quoting Hines v. Overstock.com,
Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)).
55. Id.
56. Thornton, 858 S.E.2d at 257.
57. Id. at 257–58.
58. Id. at 257.
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information field at the top of the payment screen to enter a credit card
number. In that circumstance, the on-screen keyboard concealed the
text and hyperlink informing the user of Uber’s terms and conditions
but did not conceal the “Register” button.59

The court of appeals concluded that the terms and conditions were not
so inconspicuous as to mean that Thornton could not have assented to
them as a matter of law.60 The dark gray text and blue, underlined
hyperlink appeared clearly against the white background of the payment
screen, and the blue of the hyperlink further drew attention to the terms
and conditions, “such that a reasonable smartphone user would know
that more information would be found if he clicked upon the hyperlink.”61
This type of browsewrap agreement, which permits the user to manifest
assent to hyperlinked terms and conditions by implication through
continued use of the product, was upheld in other jurisdictions where the
text was found to be sufficiently conspicuous to a reasonably prudent
user, and failure to read a contract does not excuse a party’s obligations
under the contract.62 Therefore, under Georgia’s objective standard of
assent, Thornton could have been bound by the terms and conditions
after he registered his account.63
The clarity of the text, however, did not end the inquiry. As Uber itself
acknowledged, Thornton had used a credit card when he registered for
the app, and the pop-up keyboard might have covered the text when he
was entering his card information.64 “Under Georgia’s objective theory of
intent, Thornton cannot have assented to Uber’s terms and conditions if
he never had the opportunity to see them.”65 Because of the keyboard
issue, questions of material fact remained as to whether “the terms and
conditions were either never displayed or displayed for an unreasonably
short amount of time such that Thornton would not have seen them.”66
Uber also contended that it subsequently sent Thornton an email with a
link to updated terms and conditions and that his continued use of the
app after that email indicated assent, but the court determined a

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id. at 258.
Id. at 259.
Id. at 258–59 n.1.
Id. at 259.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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question of fact existed as to whether Thornton received that email.67 For
these reasons, the court reversed the order compelling arbitration and
remanded for further proceedings to resolve these outstanding
questions.68
The Thornton case demonstrates that while browsewrap agreements
may be upheld in Georgia courts, the mere fact of a link to terms and
conditions is not sufficient by itself to support a finding of assent by the
end user.69 The courts should consider the full context of the agreement,
including whether the functioning of the website or app in practice
interfered with what otherwise might have been a reasonably clear
presentation. Practitioners should carefully review not only screenshots
or markups of the pages, but the actual experience of proceeding through
the site or app on the platform used by the customer to gain a full picture
of how clear and conspicuous the terms and conditions might be to a
reasonable user.
VI. AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY
Vehicles operating on public roads are subject to dual regulation by
the federal government and states in which they are registered and
driven. Autonomous vehicles (AV) have opened a new dimension in
vehicle regulation. Rule makers must keep up with the innovation in real
time in all areas that AV technology reaches, from infrastructure to
public safety. While AV regulation is still in relative infancy, it has begun
at both the state and federal levels.
While it was an atypical year due to COVID-19, the Georgia legislature
enacted a rule regarding AVs during this survey period. Effective June
30, 2020, operators of AVs are included in the statute defining persons
exempt from having a Georgia driver’s license while operating a vehicle
in the state.70 The statute lists categories of persons exempt from having
licenses, like employees of the federal government driving work vehicles,
nonresidents who possess licenses from other states, and military
servicemembers with foreign-issued licenses.71 The final exempt “person”
listed in the statute is “[a] fully autonomous vehicle with the automated
driving system engaged or the operator of a fully autonomous vehicle

67. Id. The court did not consider whether O.C.G.A. § 10-12-15(b), regarding when an
electronic record is deemed received, had any bearing on this matter because the parties
had not argued the statute in the trial court. Id. at 260 n.3.
68. Id. at 260.
69. Id.
70. O.C.G.A. § 40-5-21 (2020).
71. O.C.G.A § 40-5-21(a).
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with the automated driving system engaged.”72 While the wording is
awkward, this statute highlights a prevalent topic in AV regulation:
exemption from rules applicable to traditional motor vehicles and their
drivers.
In February 2021, bills were introduced in both the House and the
Senate seeking to exempt fully autonomous vehicles from certain vehicle
equipment requirements.73 Amendments to several statutes were
proposed, like exempting AVs from the rule requiring motor vehicles to
be equipped with a working speedometer, including AVs with
motorcycles in rules pertaining to multiple-beam road lighting
equipment, allowing the use of electric motor to apply parking brakes,
and exemption from mirror and windshield rules affecting a driver’s
visibility.74 The bills also sought to amend the operational rules for AVs
and state consumer laws.75 The proposals essentially tried to work AVs
into Chapter 8, Title 40 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated,
relating to equipment and inspection of motor vehicles, but it was not a
good fit.
The House bill died in committee while the Senate bill continued.
Working through the bill seemingly highlighted the vast differences
between vehicles operated by human drivers and AVs, and the confusion
that would arise by trying to regulate them jointly. The language that
ultimately passed in May 2021 was succinct. Rather than carve out
exceptions to the existing rules for AVs, O.C.G.A. § 40-8-1(b) now states,
Unless otherwise required by federal law, rule or regulation, a fully
autonomous vehicle that is designed to be operated exclusively by the
automated driving system for all trips shall not be subject to any
provisions of this article that relate to or support motor vehicle
operation by a human driver and are not relevant to the operation of
an automated driving system.76

While statutes specifically for AVs are slowly emerging, it seems clear
that this is the direction in which the legislature is going.
VII.SHAREABLE DOCKLESS MOBILITY DEVICE RENTALS
Regulation of electric scooters and bicycles is handled primarily at the
municipal level in Georgia. Readers of last year’s Survey will recall that
the Georgia Senate attempted to update the Rules of the Road to address
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at § 40-5-21(a)(13).
Ga. H.R. Bill 249, Reg. Sess. (2021); Ga. S. Bill 165, Reg. Sess. (2021).
O.C.G.A. §§ 40-8-8, 40-8-30, 40-8-52, 40-8-72, 40-8-73.
O.C.G.A. § 40-8-11.
O.C.G.A. § 40-8-1(b).
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safety issues with electric scooters by passing Senate Bill 159 during the
first part of the 2020 legislative session.77 The Georgia House of
Representatives failed to vote on Senate Bill 159 when the session
reconvened in June 2020, however,78 and the General Assembly did not
renew its efforts during the 2021 legislative session. As a result, electric
scooters remain notably absent from state safety regulations of motorized
vehicles and transportation devices.79
VIII.CONCLUSION
As in so many other areas of American life, the COVID-19 pandemic
continued to affect the commercial transportation world during 2020 and
2021 through court closures and the truncation of the 2020 legislative
session. While the law of commercial transportation remained relatively
stable during this survey period, practitioners should be prepared for
backlogged legislation and judicial opinions to emerge as the legislature
and the judicial system return to their normal activities.

77. McNeeley, et al., supra note 1, at 56.
78. Ga. S. Bill 159, Reg. Sess. (2020).
79. A member of the Georgia House of Representatives introduced a separate bill in
February 2021 that would have prevented users of personal assistive mobility devices from
engaging in certain conduct, such as clinging to vehicles or carrying passengers, but the bill
did not receive a vote before the end of the session. Ga. H.R. Bill 564, Reg. Sess. (2021).

